Winners and losers in the global economy : recent trends in the international division of labour and policy challenges by Nunnenkamp, Peter
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nunnenkamp, Peter
Working Paper
Winners and losers in the global economy : recent
trends in the international division of labour and
policy challenges
Kieler Diskussionsbeiträge, No. 281
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Nunnenkamp, Peter (1996) : Winners and losers in the global
economy : recent trends in the international division of labour and policy challenges, Kieler
Diskussionsbeiträge, No. 281, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/905KIELER DISKUSSIONSBEITRAGE
KIEL DISCUSSION PAPERS
Winners and Losers in the Global Economy
Recent Trends in the International Division
of Labour and Policy Challenges
CONTENTS
by Peter Nunnenkamp
Globalised markets and production patterns offer favourable opportunities to raise
world income. Yet globalisation also fuels conflicts about the distribution of welfare
gains within and across countries. Various developing economies are poorly prepared
to meet the challenge of fiercer competition on world goods and factor markets. In in-
dustrialised countries, low-skilled workers face mounting adjustment pressures.
Multilateral trade liberalisation represents a "win-win strategy", with only a few possible
exceptions in the short run. The neomercantilist notion that the removal of trade barri-
ers is a concession to foreign trading partners is grossly fallacious. Income gains are
mainly due to the countries' own liberalisation measures. Developing countries could
have raised their share in world welfare gains if they had committed themselves more
strongly to binding trade liberalisation during the Uruguay Round negotiations.
Foreign trade and direct investment patterns reveal that the international division of la-
bour is progressing not only in a regional context but also on a truly global scale. The
opportunities for new competitors for foreign capital and technology transfers depend
on domestic economic policies in the first place. Exogenous factors such as the recent
revival of regional integration, autonomous locational decisions taken by multilateral
corporations, and technological developments cannot be blamed for failures in benefit-
ing from globalisation.
The strikingly different economic performance of developing countries in globalised
markets and production is clearly related to the progress made with respect to
macroeconomic stabilisation, physical and human capital formation, and openness to-
wards world goods and capital markets. Asian-type success stories could be repeated
elsewhere, once governments have become aware that they can no longer pursue
economic policies of their own liking.
The Triad of the EU, Japan and the United States will come under fiercer adjustment
pressure if more developing countries become involved in globalisation. Industrialised
countries have little choice but to promote human capital formation in order to strength-
en their comparative advantages in skill-intensive lines of production. Adjustment
needs have been handled most effectively in Japan so far. By contrast, high unem-
ployment in the EU, especially of low-skilled workers, appears to be the price that has
to be paid for insufficient wage flexibility and structural change.
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ISSN 0455 - 0420I. Welfare Generation and Distributional Conflicts in the World Economy
A new catchword has been born recently: globa-
lisation. Economically speaking, globalisation
means the increasing interdependence of markets
and production in different countries through
trade in goods and services, cross-border flows
of. capital, and technology transfers. Accord-
ingly, a more sophisticated division of labour
may be achieved by fragmentation of production
processes on a worldwide scale. Firms may
source this component from one country and that
component from another country. It would then
be increasingly difficult to determine where cer-
tain products that are assembled in one particu-
lar country have actually been made.
1. Specialisation through Foreign
Trade
An increase in the international division of la-
bour is by no means a completely new phenome-
non. Foreign trade has grown faster than world-
wide production over the last three decades or so
(GATT various issues). The world economy had
become more integrated long before globalisa-
tion emerged as a major issue of political and
academic debate. Foreign trade is well known
for providing opportunities for specialisation ac-
cording to the trading partners' comparative cost
advantages. It represents a powerful mechanism
to raise economic welfare on a worldwide scale.
Consumers and producers obtain access to final
and intermediate goods and services at cheaper
prices or better quality. Trade enlarges the rele-
vant market and, thereby, offers opportunities to
exploit economies of scale and reduce per-unit
costs of production. Additional welfare gains
may be achieved in a dynamic perspective. For-
eign trade adds to competitive pressure on do-
mestic producers. This provides stronger incen-
tives to reduce managerial slack (i.e., the so-
called X-inefficiency) and induces a permanent
search for process and product innovations.
It is equally well known that the welfare-in-
creasing properties of free trade have not pre-
vented the persistence of restrictive trade poli-
cies. Free trade is not in everybody's interest,
but involves distributional conflicts. Economic
theory has shown that that production factor
which is relatively scarce in a given economy
may be worse off under free trade conditions
than under conditions of nationally segmented
production and markets. This is the basic mes-
sage of the famous Stolper-Samuelson theorem
(Stolper and Samuelson 1941). For industrial-
ised countries, this theorem implies that the in-
come position of low-skilled workers is nega-
tively affected once trade with countries whose
comparative cost advantages are shaped by a
relatively rich endowment with low-skilled la-
bour is allowed for. Hence, it is not surprising
that the removal of trade restrictions is resisted
by national interest groups in economic sectors
for which a progressing international division of
labour would result in fiercer competitive pres-
sure in economic sectors from abroad.
A free trading environment may give rise to
distributional conflicts in an international per-
spective as well. Welfare gains tend to be un-
evenly distributed across countries, and it is still
heavily debated whether free trade would help
convergence in per capita income between to-
day's rich and poor countries, or would result in
growing asymmetries in the world economy. An
extreme view is taken by the so-called depend-
ency school of Third World development, which
still claims that industrialised "core" countries
grow at the expense of developing countries at
the periphery, and that international trade is used
by the former to exploit the latter (Tetreault and
Abel 1986; Hout 1993). According to this rea-
soning, poor countries could develop economi-
cally only if they remained outside the interna-
tional division of labour as designed by the
capitalist "core" of the world economy. In sharp
contrast, mainstream economists maintain that
Acknowledgement: I highly appreciate the most productive and stimulating collaboration with my colleague Erich Gund-
lach. This article draws substantially on various earlier papers co-authored by him.openness towards world goods and capital mar-
kets has a strong positive impact on economic
growth, especially in developing countries (e.g.,
Gundlach 1996; Sachs and Warner 1995).
Trade restrictions have traditionally been used
to contain distributional conflicts in the national
and international arena. Low-skilled workers in
industrialised countries have been protected by
erecting particularly high barriers against im-
ports of labour-intensive goods such as clothing
and textiles. Many developing countries have
pursued import substitution policies, i.e., they,
have discouraged imports in so-called infant in-
dustries in order to induce self-reliant industri-
alisation. Trade restrictions have retarded but
not stopped the development towards a more so-
phisticated international division of labour.
More surprisingly perhaps, more and more de-
veloping countries have liberalised their import
regime unilaterally during the last round of
multilateral trade negotiations in the GATT
framework (Uruguay Round). Obviously, it has
become more widely accepted that the protection
of non-competitive factors of production in-
volves significant costs in terms of macro-
economic welfare losses. Persistent import
substitution policies have resulted in misalloca-
tion of resources, prevented the exploitation of
economies of scale in narrow domestic markets,
and impaired the welfare-increasing role of a
competitive business environment. In other
words, restrictive trade policies have turned out
to be less effective in containing distributional
conflicts than had been expected by many deci-
sion-makers, while welfare losses have imposed
a high burden on the economies as a whole.
2. The Impact of Globalisation
All this had become rather obvious well before
the term globalisation became widely used when
discussing recent trends in the international di-
vision of labour and the implications these
trends might have for the world market position
of different countries or country groups and the
income position of certain factors of production
within particular countries. What has been iden-
tified by various economists as a relatively new
phenomenon in the world economy is the dra-
matic increase in the international redistribution
of ownership through cross-border capital flows
since the early 1980s. Flows of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI), for instance, have grown even
much faster than international trade (IMF vari-
ous issues). In addition, other forms of interna-
tional investment cooperation such as licensing,
offshore processing, and so-called strategic alli-
ances between companies of different jurisdic-
tions issues gained prominence (Nunnenkamp et
al. 1994: 27-43).
What are the implications of higher capital
mobility and closer interfirm cooperation across
borders for welfare generation and distributional
conflicts in the world economy? The conse-
quence of recent development is that the interna-
tional division of labour is pushed forward by
various mechanisms at the same time. Further
opportunities for specialisation emerge if trade
flows are supplemented by capital flows and in-
terfirm agreements on technology transfers. De-
veloping countries may gain better access to in-
ternationally mobile factors of production with
which they are relatively poorly endowed. In the
case of capital inflows, for instance, global wel-
fare would increase to the extent that the mar-
ginal productivity of capital in capital-poor
countries exceeds productivity in capital-rich
countries. Interfirm technology cooperation may
enhance product and process innovations, as
joint research and development (R&D) activities
render it possible to share high R&D expenses
and to spread fixed costs over a larger volume of
production.
However, the international mobility of factors
of production does not only offer additional wel-
fare gains for the world as a whole. Globalisa-
tion also adds to distributional conflicts, both
nationally and internationally, as compared to a
situation with segmented factor markets. In ef-
fect, globalisation results in a closer integration
of labour markets at a worldwide scale.
1 This
favours high-skilled workers in industrialised
countries, who have relatively few foreign com-
petitors. By contrast, for low-skilled workers in
these countries, globalisation amplifies the ad-
justment burden that would have resulted from
international trade alone.Low-skilled labour in industrialised countries
faces an almost perfectly elastic supply of low-
paid competitors around the world. Furthermore,
globalisation promotes the general availability of
standardised technologies. According to the
Rybczynski theorem (Rybczynski 1955), this
should lead to an increase in the world market
supply of goods the production of which uses
low-skilled labour relatively intensively, and of
goods that can be produced with ubiquitous
technologies. The increase in world market sup-
ply should reduce the prices of such goods, rela-
tive to the prices of human-capital-intensive and
technologically advanced goods. Industrialised
countries have little choice under such condi-
tions but to foster industrial restructuring and
specialise in the production of human-capital-
intensive and high-tech goods. Low-skilled la-
bour in industrialised countries is confronted
with an uncomfortable trade-off: it is threatened
by rising unemployment unless wage reductions,
relative to the factor reward for human and
physical capital, are accepted.
3. Theory and Reality: Conflicting
Propositions
According to theoretical reasoning, there would
be no production of low-skilled labour-intensive
goods in industrialised countries (and, corre-
spondingly, no production of human-capital-in-
tensive goods in developing countries). Of
course, reality is somewhat different. Transport
costs, policy-induced deterrents to international
transactions, and the immobility of some factors
of production contribute to maintaining an in-
dustry structure that would be totally obsolete
otherwise. The gap between theory and reality
depends on the significance of transaction costs.
Declining transaction costs suggest that the gap
has (and will continue to) become less and less
pronounced. Various constraints that have pre-
vented firms from implementing globalisation
strategies have disappeared. Thanks to the mi-
cro-electronics revolution, communication tech-
nologies have undergone a dramatic change.
New production and organisation technologies
such as CAD (computer-aided design) and CIM
(computer-integrated manufacturing) have
evolved. Successive GATT rounds have reduced
trade barriers. In addition, capital markets have
been liberalised, especially during the last dec-
ade, and many business services have become
internationally tradable. International financial
centres provide for 24-hours trading in all sorts
of financial assets. Business services such as
banking and insurance have been deregulated so
that standardised business services are available
around the world. Finally, transport costs have
been reduced, since new technologies allow for
economies of scale in transportation and tend to
reduce the volume of international transport in
raw materials necessary to produce one unit of
final output.
As a consequence of declining transaction
costs, multinational corporations can choose
among an increasing number of options in order
to engage in cross-border ventures and interna-
tional investment cooperation. FDI provides a
means to jump over remaining protectionist
fences. Likewise, restrictions imposed on foreign
investors, e.g. the trade-related investment meas-
ures (TRIMs) discussed during the Uruguay
Round, may be circumvented by referring to
non-equity forms of international investment co-
operation. In particular, declining transaction
costs offer better opportunities for relocating the
production of low-skilled labour-intensive goods
and standardised lines of manufacturing to de-
veloping countries. It follows nearly by implica-
tion that developing countries should benefit
from globalisation. If so, globalisation would
improve the chances for economic catching-up
with industrialised countries and support inter-
national convergence of per capita income. It
seems to be premature to "forget convergence"
simply because "the overwhelming feature of
modern economic history is a massive diver-
gence in per capita incomes between rich and
poor countries" (Pritchett 1996: 38). Apart from
the ongoing debate on a reasonable interpreta-
tion of past growth patterns, declining transac-
tion costs suggest that the future is likely to dif-
fer in important ways from the past.
This is not to ignore that several arguments
may be raised against the proposition that
globalisation amplifies adjustment pressure forindustrialised countries and offers better oppor-
tunities for developing countries. First, it is open
to debate whether the international division of
labour is progressing really on a global scale, or
rather within a regional context. There is a
strong revival of regional trade arrangements, of
which the deepening and widening of European
integration and the formation of the North
American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) are
the most prominent examples. Countries remain-
ing outside major regional integration schemes
would run the risk of being delinked from the
international division of labour if regionalisa-
tion, rather than true globalisation, were the
dominant feature in the world economy. This ar-
gument implies that only a small group of Third
World economies with strong institutionalised
ties with major regional groupings in the devel-
oped world may benefit from closer trade and
investment relations.
Second, related to this, some economists con-
sider organisational innovations at the enterprise
level, including lean production and just-in-time
delivery, to be the driving force of interfirm net-
working with regard to sourcing and marketing
(e.g., Oman 1994). Such a networking is ex-
pected to emerge primarily on a regional basis.
According to this line of reasoning, proximity
between producers and their customers is be-
coming more important, whereas the relevance
of international differences in wage costs in
shaping locational choices of producers and in-
vestors is expected to decline. If so, the chances
of low-wage developing countries to induce
catching-up processes would be impaired. This
reasoning is in obvious conflict with the globali-
sation hypothesis, according to which declining
transaction costs encourage the fragmentation of
production processes on a global scale and ren-
der less important the proximity of producers
and customers.
Third, low-wage countries are sometimes be-
lieved to end up in a poverty trap if they special-
ise according to their comparative cost advan-
tages in low-skilled labour-intensive goods and
highly standardised lines of production (Korner
1995). This view maintains that such a speciali-
sation increases the risk of being left behind with
regard to technological progress. At least im-
plicitly, it follows from this argument that only
few developing countries can take part in global-
isation, namely those which have established a
fairly sophisticated manufacturing base through
government support granted to infant industries.
Fourth, the recent boom of FDI and other
capital flows may provide a misleading impres-
sion on the chances of capital-poor countries to
attract foreign investment funds and thereby add
to their own domestic savings. Almost perfectly
mobile financial capital flows do not necessarily
imply an increase in physical capital mobility,
which is tantamount to widening current account
imbalances.
2 As a matter of fact, physical capi-
tal flows across countries were surprisingly low
in the past, as is indicated by a strong positive
correlation between national saving and invest-
ment rates (Feldstein 1994). This correlation
should become weaker over time if production is
increasingly globalised.
Finally, global savings may fall short of meet-
ing increasing demand for foreign capital. More
and more countries, including transition econo-
mies in Central and Eastern Europe as well as
developing countries that have removed capital
controls, are approaching world capital markets.
This has fuelled fears that new competitors can
only attract capital inflows, especially FDI, at
the expense of traditional recipients.
3 Moreover,
the frequently noted concentration of FDI in de-
veloping countries on a few major recipients
seems to suggest that newcomers face bleak
prospects in attracting a significant share of FDI
(e.g., UNCTAD 1995a: 9). By contrast, the
globalisation hypothesis does not consider inter-
national capital transfers to be a zero-sum game,
but claims that there will be additional capital
flows if new investment opportunities emerge
(Bergsman and Lall 1995).
These conflicting propositions figure promi-
nently in the subsequent discussion of major
factors that are driving the integration of inter-
national goods and factor markets. The focus is
on significant changes in the world economic
environment over the last decade or so and on
the possible implications of these changes on the
generation and distribution of economic benefits
to be reaped from the internationalisation of
goods and factor markets.II. Integration of Goods Markets: Causes and Possible Implications
Before returning to international investment re-
lations, and in particular the competitive posi-
tion of different countries with regard to capital
inflows and technologically motivated coopera-
tion, major changes in the world trading envi-
ronment are assessed in the following sections.
Trade policies provided a startling picture over
much of the 1980s and early 1990s
(Nunnenkamp 1993). Multilateral trade negotia-
tions in the context of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT were stalled for years and close to a
complete breakdown. By contrast, the signifi-
cance of unilateral trade policy reforms indi-
cated that foreign trade liberalisation became
more widely accepted as a means to achieve an
efficient allocation of scarce resources and foster
economic development. Moreover, the world
economy witnessed a strong revival of regional
trade arrangements. It was feared that regional-
ism could result in hostile trading blocs; con-
cerns about "fortress Europe" figured promi-
nently in this respect.
1. Multilateral Trade Liberalisation
The Uruguay Round of the GATT was finally
concluded after more than seven years of nego-
tiations in December 1993. The achievements in
lowering barriers to international trade are sig-
nificant, although they fall short of high expec-
tations at the beginning of negotiations.
4 In
summary, the Uruguay Round was an attempt to
stop the trend towards more and more excep-
tions to the validity of multilateral GATT prin-
ciples becoming the rule, and to extend GATT
discipline to new trade issues.
a. Major Results
Market access for industrial goods was im-
proved by further tariff reductions. However,
import tariffs remain relatively high for indus-
trial goods in the production of which many de-
veloping countries enjoy a comparative advan-
tage (e.g., textiles, clothing, and electrical
goods). Moreover, tariff escalation persists, i.e.,
the processing of goods by foreign trading part-
ners is still discouraged by levying higher tariffs
on processed goods than on unprocessed goods.
Tariff escalation may hinder developing coun-
tries from becoming involved in globalised pro-
duction. Market access was also improved in
agriculture, which had been the major stumbling
bloc to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. It
was agreed to replace highly distortive quantita-
tive restrictions by import tariffs and to reduce
the latter by 36 per cent, on average, within six
years. In addition, the subsidisation of agricul-
tural products and agricultural exports is to be
curtailed.
Various steps were taken to achieve better
adherence to GATT rules. The GATT confor-
mity of free trade areas and customs unions shall
be checked more rigorously than in the past. In
the case of acute balance-of-payments crises,
import restrictions should consist of price-re-
lated measures and must be removed if they are
no longer justified. The conditions under which
anti-dumping measures may be applied were de-
fined more precisely. Safeguard clauses in the
case of a sudden import surge shall be applied in
principle on a non-discriminatory basis, rather
than selectively against particular trading part-
ners. More discipline of trading partners was
also aimed at by replacing the GATT by the
newly created World Trade .Organization
(WTO). Thereby, all previous GATT agree-
ments, including various separate codes, were
subsumed under one legal entity and member
countries can no longer opt out of specific obli-
gations ("a-la-carte approach"). The universal
applicability of trading rules is expected to en-
hance their enforceability. It remains open to
question, however, whether the revised dispute
settiement mechanism will result in more effec-
tive sanctions against breaches of WTO rules.
Especially the major players in the world econ-
omy may not turn to the WTO when trade dis-
putes emerge but rather rely on their own poten-
tial for retaliation and favour dispute settiement
on a bilateral basis.
5 The major partner will thendominate the rules of the game, which may re-
duce the gains from international trade for
weaker trading partners.
The Uruguay Round addressed various areas
in which GATT rules did not exist before, or
were not applied. First of all, it was agreed to
phase out the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA),
which had placed trade in textiles and clothing
outside the multilateral framework for decades.
This enables developing countries to make better
use of their comparative cost advantages. How-
ever, the reintegration of MFA trade into the
WTO is subject to a transition period of ten
years. Second, TRIMs, such as export obliga-
tions and local-content requirements imposed on
foreign investors, figured on the agenda. Cross-
border investment relations could have been en-
couraged if it had been decided to fully apply the
national treatment principle of the GATT/WTO
(which means equal treatment of domestic and
foreign products once border charges are paid)
and to enforce the prohibition of quantitative re-
strictions in the context of TRIMs. However, the
agreed list of measures which are considered to
violate these principles remained incomplete.
The third issue concerns trade-related intellec-
tual property rights (TRIPs) such as patents,
copyrights and trademarks. The reluctance of
various developing countries to protect property
rights and agree to internationally binding rules
was finally overcome. Some protection in this
area is economically justified, in order to pro-
vide innovators with sufficiently strong incen-
tives to engage in R&D activities.
Fourth, in the Uruguay Round it was at-
tempted to extend GATT/WTO principles to
trade in services, including finance, insurance,
transport and communication. Trade in services
has become an important issue, as potential wel-
fare gains should be particularly large in this
area where trade barriers have typically been
fairly high. The increasing tradability of busi-
ness services can be regarded as a major driving
force of globalisation, considering that the frag-
mentation of production processes depends on
the availability of such services in various loca-
tions.
6 This implies that countries in which the
provision of business services is seriously defi-
cient have less favourable prospects of attracting
investors in manufacturing. Yet, the Uruguay
Round made only limited progress in liberalising
trade in services on a multilateral scale. Nego-
tiations resulted in the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), which represents a
highly complex system of country- and sector-
specific concessions and exceptions. Each coun-
try had the option to name those service sectors
for which most favoured nation (MFN) treat-
ment was not to apply. Furthermore, conditions
for market access and national treatment were
not defined universally, but specified in another
set of country specific annexes on trade conces-
sions. Hence, GATS has achieved little more
than obliging trading partners to make restric-
tions transparent and negotiable for those serv-
ices for which MFN treatment was not ruled out
from the very beginning.
b. Welfare Effects
Various studies have assessed the trade and wel-
fare implications of the Uruguay Round.
7 Ac-
cording to a recent GATT estimate, world ex-
ports in 2005 are expected to be 9-24 per cent
higher than without the Uruguay Round. The
same study revealed gains in world income (as
of 2005) in the order of 0.3-0.9 per cent. Wel-
fare gains are expected to increase to 0.5-1.4
per cent of world income, if some of the dynamic
effects of the Uruguay Round are taken into ac-
count. The significant margins of the estimated
trade and welfare effects are due to different
specifications of the applied simulation model.
The Uruguay Round effects on trade and income
become larger if imperfect competition and in-
creasing returns to scale are allowed for in the
simulations. Moreover, the dynamic specifica-
tion of the model assumes that first-round in-
come gains, induced by trade liberalisation, re-
sult in higher savings, which would translate
into additional investment.
The margins with regard to trade and income
effects of the Uruguay Round widen further,
once various studies are compared. The simula-
tion results of all relevant studies are based on
computable general equilibrium models, but the
specific structure of these models and the under-
lying assumptions vary considerably. Differ-ences relate, inter alia, to the degree of disaggre-
gation by countries and sectors, the liberalisation
measures considered in the models, critical pa-
rameter values such as supply and demand ela-
sticities, and the time horizon of simulations.
The different estimates of the trade and wel-
fare effects of trade liberalisation have to be in-
terpreted with great caution. Some Uruguay
Round results are qualitative in nature and do
not lend themselves easily to a quantitative as-
sessment. Consequently, the GATT estimate re-
ported above took no account of any implica-
tions the agreement on GATS may have on trade
and welfare. Likewise, various dynamic effects
of trade liberalisation are difficult, if not impos-
sible to quantify. This refers especially to pro-
competitive effects which may strengthen the in-
centives to produce new goods and apply inno-
vative production techniques. Furthermore, all
simulations are benchmark studies; they assume
that the structure of the world economy remains
constant throughout the period under considera-
tion and that the Uruguay Round does not alter
net capital flows between countries. Finally, an
eventual breakdown of trade negotiations could
have resulted in outright "trade wars" so that the
Uruguay Round may be credited with having
prevented the welfare losses ensuing from such
conflicts. In summary, the Uruguay Round may
have far-reaching implications that simulation
models cannot capture.
Conceptual limitations and ambiguities not-
withstanding, the estimates on the welfare impli-
cations of the Uruguay Round offer some rele-
vant insights. Various studies have two impor-
tant findings in common. First, most countries
are going to benefit from multilateral trade lib-
eralisation, though not necessarily to the same
degree. Second, welfare gains are largely due to
the countries' own liberalisation measures,
rather than to trade concessions by their foreign
trading partners.
The first finding means that multilateral trade
liberalisation represents a "win-win strategy"
with few exceptions. About two thirds of world-
wide welfare gains tend to be concentrated on in-
dustrialised countries. It should be noted that the
EU, which was mainly responsible for various
crises in concluding the Uruguay Round, be-
longs to the major winners after its conclusion.
Taken together, developing countries are also
going to benefit. However, the estimated welfare
effects vary tremendously within this heteroge-
nous group of countries. A World Bank team,
for instance, found exceptionally high welfare
gains (in per cent of national income) for Asian
countries such as Malaysia and Thailand
(Harrison et al. 1995). Relatively advanced de-
veloping countries that are net exporters of agri-
cultural products are generally expected to
benefit more than low-income countries that are
net importers of agricultural products.
Some countries of the latter group may even
suffer from minor income losses in the short run.
This is because the outcome of the Uruguay
Round tends to have an adverse effect on the
terms of trade of commodity-based economies,
e.g. in Sub-Saharan Africa. Commodities were
not subject to significant trade restrictions even
before the Uruguay Round, so that there is little
to gain for commodity exporters in terms of
market access in the short run. At the same time,
higher import prices can be expected for coun-
tries that are largely dependent on food imports,
the world market prices of which tend to rise
once the subsidisation of agricultural production
and exports is curtailed in major food exporting
countries. In the long run, however, the outcome
for low-income and (net) food importing coun-
tries may be different. In the past, depressed
world market prices of food items added to the
discrimination of agricultural producers and ex-
porters in many developing countries. The Uru-
guay Round agreements on agriculture may in-
duce net food importers to remove discrimina-
tory policies and encourage economic restructur-
ing. Welfare effects may then turn positive in the
long run.
The short-term effects of the Uruguay Round
seem to suggest that multilateral trade liberali-
sation leads to larger divergence of per capita
income between relatively advanced and poor
countries. The second common finding of vari-
ous studies qualifies this conclusion signifi-
cantly. The concentration of welfare gains on in-
dustrialised countries is mainly due to their own
liberalisation measures, notably with regard to
agriculture and MFA trade. Likewise, the bene-10
fits of countries such as South Korea are largely
attributable to own commitments made during
the negotiations. The principal winners of the
Uruguay Round are those countries that went
furthest in terms of domestic liberalisation.
Hence, low-income countries could have in-
creased their share in worldwide welfare gains,
if they had used the Uruguay Round to reduce
the costs of persistent protection in the national
realm.
8 This applies especially to economies in
Sub-Saharan Africa which made few substantial
commitments on removing national trade barri-
ers (Sorsa 1995).
All in all, the assessment of the Uruguay
Round reveals that the political set-up of multi-
lateral trade negotiations is rather puzzling from
an economic point of view. Typically, the parties
involved aim at better access to foreign markets
and consider domestic liberalisation only to be a
concession made for the benefit of trading part-
ners. Reciprocity is the catchword among major
players, which means the balancing of mutual
concessions. Many developing countries insist
(and can legally do so) on preferential treatment
in terms of privileged market access for their
exports and less binding rules with regard to
their import restrictions. Economically, multilat-
eral trade negotiations should rather be consid-
ered a means to lock domestic liberalisation to
an international anchor and, thereby, maximise
welfare gains. For developing countries it fol-
lows that the special treatment they receive in
the GATT/WTO framework is a mixed blessing
at best, and a Pyrrhic victory at worst, espe-
cially if the incentives for structural change are
weakened in this way.
2. Regional Integration
a. Possible Conflicts
As mentioned earlier, trade liberalisation during
the last decade went beyond what was finally
agreed upon in multilateral negotiations. Various
developing countries implemented structural
adjustment programmes, which typically in-
cluded substantial reductions in import barriers.
The consequence of the collapse of socialism
and central planning in Central and Eastern
Europe was that transition economies tried hard
to integrate themselves into the international di-
vision of labour. This involved drastic liberali-
sation of foreign trade regimes.
In addition, trade liberalisation was pursued
within regional integration schemes. Major aims
of free trade areas and customs unions are to
promote intra-regional specialisation according
to the member countries' comparative advan-
tages, and to enhance the region's attractiveness
for foreign capital inflows. While integration
schemes may be instrumental to overcoming the
segmentation of national markets on the regional
level, a potential dilemma is involved on a global
scale once member countries enjoy preferential
treatment vis-a-vis outsiders. In contrast to mar-
ket-driven regionalisation, institutionalised re-
gionalism conflicts by definition with the fun-
damental GATT/WTO principles of non-
discrimination and MFN treatment.
As a matter of fact, Art. XXIV of the GATT
Treaty authorises derogations from MFN treat-
ment, if free trade areas and customs unions
cover "substantially all" the trade among mem-
ber countries and do not raise trade barriers
against outsiders. Especially the second condi-
tion is meant to prevent negative income and em-
ployment effects of regional integration schemes
on non-member countries. Such adverse effects
are most likely if integration schemes divert
trade and capital flows away from non-member
countries to member countries, rather than creatr
ing additional trade and capital flows among
member countries at no other country's expense.
In practice, it is fairly difficult to disentangle
trade and investment creation from trade and in-
vestment diversion. One would have to know
how intra-regional and extra-regional trade and
capital flows would have developed without re-
gional integration. Unavoidable ambiguity in this
respect may have added to difficulties in enforc-
ing the GATT/WTO conformity of free trade ar-
eas and customs unions. Nonetheless, it is rather
striking that none of the more than 100 prefer-
ential trade arrangements that had been notified
to the GATT until 1994 was rejected as incon-
sistent with Art. XXIV.11
The European Union has contributed a lot to
the revival of regional integration in various
parts of the world. Different starting conditions
notwithstanding, the EU was frequently consid-
ered a model, notably by developing countries in
Africa and Latin America. At the same time, the
EU exemplifies the potential conflict between
regionalism and multilateralism. In addition to
intra-EU liberalisation, the EU maintains a
multi-layer system of preferential trading ar-
rangements with third countries on a reciprocal
or unilateral basis.
9 The consequence of the
EU's extremely discriminatory trade policies
was that only about one quarter of total EU
trade and 60 per cent of extra-EU imports were
conducted under MFN conditions in the late
1980s and early 1990s, compared with almost
90 per cent of US trade (Sideri 1990; GATT
1993). Traditionally, regionalism took prece-
dence over multilateralism. In the Community's
own words, trade policies reveal the EU's
"enthusiastic support for and active involvement
in free trade arrangements of a regional charac-
ter" (GATT 1991: 32).
Economic integration in Europe proceeded
along two lines. First, the existing EU members
deepened their integration by further liberalising
and harmonising economic policies. The com-
pletion of the Internal Market and the planned
introduction of a common currency are clear in-
dications to this effect. Second, EU membership
was enlarged, recently as a result of the acces-
sion of the EFTA countries. Integration widen-
ing will continue; although accession of Euro-
pean transition economies is still pending, they
are benefiting from substantial trade preferences
since the conclusion of the Europe Agreements,
which have put transition economies well ahead
of all developing countries in terms of conditions
of access to EU markets.
All this had raised concerns that European
integration might degenerate into a "fortress
Europe". Many developing countries feared that
trade and capital flows would be diverted away
from them to low-wage locations at the EU pe-
riphery and associated countries in Central and
Eastern Europe. Moreover, partly as a response
to integration deepening and widening in Europe,
the United States concluded the NAFTA agree-
ment with Canada and Mexico, and launched the
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. The EU
bears some responsibility for the recent change
in US trade policies: "After having guaranteed
the functioning of the multilateral system of
trade negotiations ... for more than 40 years, ...
the United States has lost confidence in the ef-
fectiveness of the GATT process and will likely
turn towards a new trade strategy favouring the
establishment of additional free trade zones un-
der US leadership and a policy of aggressive bi-
lateralism" (Stehn 1993: 3).
Arguably, this move renders it more difficult
for developing countries, except those being part
of major integration schemes (Mexico) or bene-
fiting from close institutionalised ties with such
schemes, to participate successfully in the inter-
national division of labour. This may explain
why many outsiders of the EU and NAFTA
would like to become insiders. However, re-
quests for accession have met with lukewarm re-
sponse by present member countries. Conse-
quently, most developing countries may have
had little choice but to take a second-best ap-
proach towards regional integration, i.e., to
strengthen economic relations among them-
selves, either through institutionalised regional-
ism as in Latin America (e.g., MERCOSUR) or
market driven regionalisation as in Asia.
b. Global and Regional Trade Patterns
Although conclusive evidence on the significance
of trade diversion induced by regional integra-
tion schemes is almost impossible to produce,
recent trends in intra-regional and extra-regional
trade allow for some tentative conclusions on
whether regional, rather than global networking
was the dominant feature in the world economy
during the 1980s and early 1990s. Table 1 offers
several interesting insights in this respect. First
of all, it is not surprising that intra-regional
trade linkages are clearly most developed in
Europe, considering the EU's long tradition and
advanced stage of economic integration. More
than two-thirds of total EU exports go to neigh-
bouring countries (other EU members, EFTA
countries, and Central and Eastern Europe).
However, the share of extra-regional exports did12




















































































































not decline further since 1980. The process of
completing the Internal Market had little impact
on the relative importance of intra-EU trade
until 1993. EU exports to Central and Eastern
Europe continued to play a minor role shortly
after the collapse of central planning, when insti-
tutionalised economic cooperation between the
EU and transition economies gained momentum.
The growth of EU exports to both member
countries and non-European countries was
largely in line with the growth of world trade in
1980-1993. As far as the EU is concerned, the
international division of labour has proceeded
both regionally and globally.
Second, intra-regional trade has traditionally
been much less significant for the United States
than for Europe, even if US exports to all Latin
American countries are considered to be part of
regional trade relations. US exports to Canada
grew overproportionally, but the United States
resemble the EU in two important respects: In-
tra-regional and extra-regional trade increased at
a similar rate in 1980-1993 and total US export
growth was in line with world export growth. By
contrast, the expansion of Latin America's trade
relations with non-American countries remained
marginal and was clearly below overall export
growth. Nonetheless, the evidence for a region-
alisation of Latin American trade patterns is
weak. While the United States absorbed a sig-
nificantly larger share of Latin American ex-
ports in 1993 than in 1980, Latin American
partner countries continued to account for only
one fifth of the region's overall exports. Re-
newed attempts at regional integration were thus
not effective in raising the share of trade among
Latin American economies until 1993.
1
0 Possi-
ble effects of the formation of NAFTA in 1992
are not yet reflected in the available data. Expec-
tations are, however, that "NAFTA will have
only a small impact upon the rest of the world"
(Bouzas 1995: 15). Most strikingly perhaps,Biblfothek
s fur Welfrwirfsch<§£?
13
NAFTA has been estimated to have only mar-
ginal trade diversion effects on non-member
countries in Latin America.
1
1
Third, regional trade relations expanded most
rapidly in Asia. Asian developing countries ab-
sorbed a rising share of Japanese exports and
trade among Asian developing countries soared
by a factor of 6.2 in 1980-1993. It should be
noted that substantially enlarged regional net-
working in Asia was market-driven, in contrast
to the institutionalised regionalism elsewhere.
More importantly though, regional networking in
Asia is highly unlikely to have retarded the
globalisation of Asia's trade relations. Among
the countries and regions considered in Table 1,
it is only for Japan and Asian developing coun-
tries that extra-regional exports grew faster than
world trade. The share of exports of Asian de-
veloping countries to non-Asian destinations in
world exports doubled to nearly 9 per cent in
1993.
The regional structure of EU imports of
manufactures underscores that close institutional
ties with major regional integration schemes are
neither necessary nor sufficient to participate
successfully in the international division of la-
bour through trade.
1
2 Developing countries of
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific region (the
so-called ACP group) were granted higher trade
preferences by the EU than any other developing
country. Nevertheless, they failed to increase
their share in EU imports of manufactures. By
contrast, various Asian developing countries
were most successful in penetrating EU markets,
despite missing trade privileges and geographi-
cal distance.
Overall, recent trade patterns contradict the
notion that regionalism is the dominant factor
shaping the international division of labour.
Rather, closer trade linkages have emerged both
regionally and globally. Membership in, and
privileged market access to major integration
schemes per se are unlikely to advance the inter-
national competitiveness of trading partners. Es-
pecially the Asian experience suggests that insti-
tutionalised ties with regional integration
schemes matter less than domestic economic
policies when it comes to explaining success and
failure in reaping benefits from international
trade. This is not.to deny that countries without
such ties could have performed even better, if
regional groupings had liberalised externally,
parallel to internal liberalisation, and had re-
frained from discrimination against non-
associated countries in particular.
Regionalism inherently carries the risk of
trade diversion at the expense of outsiders. Such
risks could be minimised if the provisions of
GATT Art. XXIV were rigorously enforced.
Regional integration and multilateral trade lib-
eralisation could indeed reinforce each other, if
two requirements were met: All preferential
trade arrangements should be "GATTAVTO-
Plus" accords in the sense that regional liberali-
sation goes beyond multilateral commitments,
while no further trade barriers are erected
against non-members. In addition, trading part-
ners would have to commit themselves to open
regionalism by relaxing restrictive accession
procedures. Potential members should be al-
lowed to join once they are prepared to adhere to
the regional liberalisation accord.
III. Capital Transfers and International Investment Cooperation
In addition to trade, international capital flows
represent a powerful mechanism pushing for a
more sophisticated division of labour. The ef-
fects on structural change in production patterns
in general, and on relocation of labour-intensive
and standardised lines of manufacturing to de-
veloping countries in particular, depend on the
actual degree of capital mobility. The growth
prospects of various countries may be impaired
if private foreign capital owners consider just a
few investment locations to be attractive. In-
vestment in most economies would then remain
constrained by relatively low domestic savings
(plus foreign aid, which is not considered in the
following) as well as insufficient access to tech-
nology.14
1. International Mobility of Capital
Theoretical reasoning suggests that mobile
capital will flow to countries which are rela-
tively poorly equipped with this production fac-
tor. This is because the marginal productivity of
capital and, hence, the return to capital should
be higher there than in capital-rich economies.
By attracting foreign capital inflows, capital-
poor countries may add to their own domestic
savings, thereby increasing investment and pro-
moting economic growth. In other words, capital
mobility across borders implies that national
savings and investment rates should be uncorre-
lated with each other.
In reality, however, high investment rates
usually went along with high domestic savings.
The difference between investment and domestic
savings, which equals the current account defi-
cit, rarely exceeded 5 per cent of gross domestic
product (GDP) over longer time periods. Econo-
metric analyses pointed to a de facto segmen-
tation of capital markets, especially in the 1960s
and 1970s; the correlation between savings and
investment rates in OECD countries was found
to be close to one.
1
3
Does this mean that, in contrast to theoretical
predictions, capital is rather immobile? It is in-
deed hard to dispute that capital owners reveal a
fairly strong home country bias: "Ignorance, risk
aversion and prudence keep capital close to
home" (Feldstein 1994: 10). Nevertheless, it can
be maintained that international capital transfers
have played an important role in the world econ-
omy, and are likely to gain prominence in the
future. First of all, empirical evidence indicates
that the home country bias of capital owners has
become weaker in the 1980s.
1
4 Second, capital
mobility is underestimated if, as typically done,
the correlation between savings and investment
rates is calculated on the basis of long-term av-
erages of these rates; this procedure "ignores net
capital flows that have occurred in reverse di-
rections during the period over which averages
are taken" (Sinn 1992: 1165). Calculations
based on annual data reveal that the savings-
investment link has become looser after 1973
and support the proposition of an increasing
capital mobility over time. Third, currency risk
appears to have been the main reason for the
strong home country bias of capital owners in
the past. This deterrent to greater capital mobil-
ity may become less significant in the future. As
argued below, globalisation adds to the incen-
tives of governments to strive for macro-
economic stability, which would help containing
exchange rate volatility. Finally, some forms of
capital seem to have become truly global al-
ready. This refers especially to FDI which "does
contribute to real cross-border capital flows"
(Feldstein 1994: 15).
2. The Rise and Distribution of FDI
The recent boom of FDI underscores its special
role in transferring national savings across bor-
ders. Worldwide FDI flows soared from an an-
nual average of US$92 billion in 1983-1988 to
US$226 billion in 1994 (UNCTAD 1995b: An-
nex Table 1). The subsequent assessment of FDI
does not present a complete picture on the inter-
national allocation of mobile factors of produc-
tion, since other forms of capital and technology
transfers are neglected. It should also be noted
that the conceptual limitations to assess the de-
gree of FDI diversion are still more serious than
in the case of trade diversion. Nonetheless, re-
cent FDI patterns offer interesting insights, no-
tably on whether regional integration schemes
have induced significant changes in the world-
wide distribution of FDI flows and on the wide-
spread belief that FDI is highly concentrated on
just a few host countries. In contrast to short-
term and more volatile capital flows such as
portfolio investment, FDI typically represents a
longer lasting commitment of foreign investors
to a host country. Hence, FDI provides a better
indication of the internationalisation strategies of
multinational corporations, especially in manu-
facturing.
Industrialised countries have traditionally at-
tracted the bulk of FDI inflows (Table 2). Re-
cently, however, their share in total inflows has
declined from about four fifths to slightly less
than 60 per cent in 1994. Developing countries
as well as transition economies in Central and
Eastern Europe have emerged as important hosts15
of FDI inflows. This indicates that an increasing
number of countries has become involved in in-
ternationalisation strategies of multinational
corporations.






























































aAnnual average. — Newly industrialising economies: Hong
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. — Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, Philippines and Thailand.
Source: UNCTAD (1995b: Annex Table 1).
The boom of FDI may reflect a regionalisa-
tion of international investment activities rather
than true globalisation. If so, the formation of
regional blocs should have resulted in FDI di-
version away from non-member countries. The
deepening of EU integration in the aftermath of
the Internal Market programme of 1985 may
provide a case in point. The EU indeed attracted
substantially higher FDI inflows in 1989-1991
than in 1983-1988 (US$89 billion versus
US$27 billion on an annual average) (UNCTAD
1995b: Annex Table 1). As a result, the EU's
share in worldwide FDI inflows increased from
30 to 47 per cent (Table 2). EU integration
caused higher intra-EU FDI since European
companies became more eurocentric, and it also
induced higher FDI inflows from Japan and the
United States.
1
5 The EU's attractiveness for
foreign risk capital was largely because interna-
tional investors anticipated the completion of the
Internal Market and its extension to prospective
EU member countries. Fears of restrictive EU
trade policies may have induced FDI in some
instances, e.g., Japanese investment in the auto-
mobile industry, as FDI offered a means to jump
over protectionist fences. However; the larger
part of FDI appears to have been motivated by
market integration (both in manufacturing and
services) and cost advantages in member coun-
tries at the EU periphery.
The rise of intra-EU FDI mainly affected EU
FDI outflows to the United States, while Euro-
pean companies neglected developing countries
only temporarily and largely because of home-
made economic disturbances in Latin America.
Likewise, European integration has not led US
and Japanese investors to curtail their FDI in
developing countries. Hence, the boom of FDI
flows to the EU during the process of complet-
ing the Internal Market is rather unlikely to have
resulted in significant FDI diversion at the ex-
pense of developing countries. Moreover, it was
a rather short-term phenomenon. In 1992-1994,
the EU's share in worldwide FDI inflows went
down to 37 per cent. This supports the earlier
conclusion that regional integration must not be
interpreted as the dominant feature of the inter-
national division of labour.
Further evidence to this effect is provided by
FDI patterns in Asia. The share of nine dynamic
Asian developing countries
1
6 in worldwide FDI
inflows rose by a factor of 2.7, when comparing
1983-1988 and 1992-1994 (Table 2). FDI re-
lations among developing countries in Asia
gathered considerable momentum since the early
1980s, but they can only partly explain the ris-
ing share in worldwide FDI flows.
17 It should
also be recalled that Asian developing countries
did not maintain close institutionalised ties with
either the EU or NAFTA. Hence, the dramatic
shift of FDI to this region has to be attributed to
a significant extent to globalisation effects.
Another issue concerns the frequently noted
concentration of FDI in developing countries on
a few fairly advanced host countries. This ob-
servation seems to imply that most developing
countries are severely restricted when it comes
to participating in the increasing division of la-
bour through FDI, which constitutes a major
channel of international technology transfers. If,
for whatever reason, foreign investors focussed
persistently on the same small group of host
economies, the majority of developing countries
would probably receive less capital and technol-16
ogy than would be necessary to derive benefits
from the globalisation of production and mar-
kets. These countries could then be caught in a
poverty trap: Globalisation would only support
developing countries that have a command of the
relevant technologies, but would not induce eco-
nomic development in less advanced countries.
However, the assumption of a more or less
constant pattern of FDI flows to a few selected
countries is hardly compatible with recent
changes in the regional distribution of FDI in-
flows. Besides Asia, Central and East European
economies in transition increased their share in
worldwide FDI flows. This development is obvi-
ously related to progress achieved in economic
transformation, which encouraged the integra-
tion of transition economies into the interna-
tional division of labour. By contrast, Latin
America, which had been the preferred host re-
gion for FDI in the Third World until the out-
break of the foreign debt crisis, appeared to be
the main loser in the 1980s. Recently, though,
FDI flows to Latin America have recovered.
Furthermore, the regional share in worldwide
FDI flows is rather misleading when assessing
the position of Latin American economies in the
context of globalisation. Several countries in this
region (including Argentina, Chile and Mexico)
recorded tremendous FDI inflows in the early
1990s (Nunnenkamp 1996: 4-7). This indicates
that attractiveness for FDI can be regained in the
aftermath of major economic crises, once consis-
tent economic policy reforms are implemented.
The counterfactual is provided by Brazil, which
was less reform-minded until recently and lost
its previous top position among developing
countries with regard to FDI inflows. Latecom-
ers in economic policy reform such as Brazil
may face an uphill struggle against competitors
which are presently absorbing the bulk of FDI
inflows. Yet, international competition for FDI
is not a zero-sum game (Bergsman and Lall
1995). Hence, if a country such as Brazil re-
stores its attractiveness for foreign investors,
additional FDI may be the result, rather than
Brazil having to divert FDI from other locations.
The evidence on FDI contradicts the notion
that only few developing countries may benefit
from globalisation. While more than two thirds
of FDI flows to all developing countries have
continuously been concentrated on the ten larg-
est host economies (UNCTAD 1995a), the
country composition of the group of best per-
formers has changed over time. Even more im-
portantly, it is per capita FDI inflows that mat-
ter for the chances of newcomers to enhance
their locational attractiveness for foreign inves-
tors. In per capita terms, various small Latin
American economies, for example, have proved
more attractive than their large neighbours
(Nunnenkamp 1996: 7). Finally, the chances of
newcomers to participate in globalisation have
further improved since some relatively advanced
developing countries have emerged as foreign
investor countries.
1
8 Notably in Asia, foreign
investors based in newly industrialising coun-
tries are heavily engaged in less advanced
economies in the region (especially in China).
Taken together, the empirical evidence offers
two major conclusions. First, booming FDI is
not just a consequence of the recent move to-
wards regional integration, but reflects true
globalisation to a significant extent. Second, the
frequently noted concentration of FDI on a small
group of relatively advanced host economies
tends to underrate the chances of newcomers,
especially of low-income developing countries,
to derive economic benefits from globalisation
by attracting FDI.
3. Generation and Application of
Technological Innovations
The concern that many economies may be de-
linked from global trends also relates to the
marginal role of developing countries in the gen-
eration of technological knowledge. As a matter
of fact, technological innovation continues to be
the domain of industrialised countries. A first
indication to this effect is that industrialised
countries still received 98 per cent of worldwide
non-financial property income in 1993, which
mainly comprised royalties and license fees ac-
cruing to foreign owners of intangible assets
(IMF various issues: Part 2, Table C13).
1
9 In
contrast to their negligible share in worldwide
receipts of non-financial property income, devel-17
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4192 95.7 2.3 1.5
1752 99.1 0.5 0.4
532 96.6 2.6 0.2
1224 90.9 4.9 3.4
Source: Freeman and Hagedoorn (1994: 775).
oping countries transferred about 9 per cent of
worldwide payments of property income to for-
eign owners of intangible assets in 1986-1993.
Furthermore, so-called strategic technology alli-
ances involving companies of different jurisdic-
tions have been largely confined to OECD-based
enterprises (Table 3). Especially joint R&D ac-
tivities were almost exclusively pursued within
the Triad of the EU, Japan and the United
States. The participation of companies from
newly industrialising and other developing
countries was still below 10 per cent in the case
of joint ventures.
Yet, these observations do not imply that most
economies are excluded from technological pro-
gress. Not surprisingly, technologically moti-
vated interfirm cooperation is mainly a business
between equally advanced partners operating at
the forefront of technological progress. Compa-
nies located in less advanced countries rarely
provide for the required match of partners in this
field of interfirm cooperation. Factor endow-
ments typically prevailing in these countries pre-
vent a stronger role in the generation of techno-
logical innovations. Put differently, strategic
technology alliances are an inappropriate means
to integrate developing countries into corporate
globalisation strategies. Nonetheless, the Third
World can derive benefits from transfers of
technology. It is the application of internation-
ally available technologies which matters most
for developing economies. Instruments other
than strategic alliances, notably international
trade in capital goods and FDI flows, are better
suited for transferring technology to these coun-
tries. The preceding assessment of FDI flows
has indicated that the attractiveness of Third
World economies for foreign capital is not de-
termined by their minor role in producing new
technologies, but rather by their capability to
apply existing technologies. Consequently, fears
appear to be largely unfounded that new manu-
facturing techniques will render it more difficult
for developing countries to attract FDI in the
future, which would increase the risk of falling




Another question is whether developing
economies receive technologies that fit their do-
mestic factor endowments. What can be ex-
pected under conditions of globalisation is that
newly industrialising economies should receive a
higher share of sophisticated technologies than
less advanced developing countries. Empirical
evidence on the relative importance of so-called
core technologies in international technological
cooperation supports this proposition. Informa-
tion technology, biotechnology and new materi-
als, which are commonly considered to consti-
tute the core of technological progress, clearly
dominate strategic alliances and technology
transfer agreements between OECD-based com-
panies (Freeman and Hagedoorn 1994: 774).
The share of these core technologies in techno-
logical cooperation involving companies from
newly industrialising countries is considerably
lower (about 50 per cent). Most interestingly
though, about two thirds of all partnerships in-
volving firms from less advanced developing
countries are in areas other than core technolo-
gies. This pattern reveals that the focus of tech-
nological cooperation is related to factor en-
dowments of the countries concerned. Hence,
developing countries appear to be best prepared
to participate successfully in globalisation and
attract appropriate technologies if they specialise
according to their comparative advantages.18
IV. Developing Countries in the Era of Globalisation: Miracles and Dramas
The preceding evaluation has provided various
clues as to a closer integration of developing
countries into the international division of labour
through trade and investment relations. The glo-
balisation of production and markets seems to
offer favourable chances for economic catching-
up with industrialised countries. At the same
time, it appears that various developing coun-
tries have failed to seize the opportunities in-
volved in globalisation. After shortly portraying
some failures and success stories, the subsequent
section offers an explanation for the diverse eco-
nomic performance within the Third World.
Table 4 - The Integration of Third World Regions into
the World Economy, 1985 and 1995 (per cent)
All developing countries












































Source: World Bank (various issues).
1. Recent Trends and Future Pros-
pects
Closer trade and investment linkages have
evolved for the Third World as a whole. All de-
veloping countries have nearly doubled their
share in world exports of manufactures since the
mid-1980s, to slightly less than 24 per cent in
1993 (Gundlach and Nunnenkamp 1996b: Table
1). According to data from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF various issues), all (non-
oil) developing countries attracted nearly 40 per
cent of worldwide FDI flows in 1994. Table 4
shows that total exports of developing countries
have grown faster during the last decade than
their gross national product (GNP), while the
expansion of FDI inflows still exceeded export
growth by far. This is exactly what one could
expect under conditions of enhanced involve-
ment of developing countries in globalisation
strategies.
However, developments for the Third World
as a whole obscure remarkable differences be-
tween various country groups. Both indicators
presented in Table 4 reveal that it is mainly East
Asia which has become more integrated into the
international division of labour.
2
1 By contrast,
export expansion (relative to GNP growth) re-
mained fairly low in Sub-Saharan Africa and
turned out to be negative in Latin America as
well as East Europe and Central Asia. Sub-
Saharan Africa stands out insofar it is the only
region for which FDI growth lagged behind ex-
port growth. The persistently low level of the
FDI/exports ratio suggests that particularly Sub-
Saharan Africa has not benefited from the trend
towards globalised production so far. Neverthe-
less, Table 4 contradicts the widespread belief
that only some newly industrialising economies
in Asia take part in globalisation. The
FDI/exports ratio supports the proposition that
Latin America has restored its locational attrac-
tiveness for FDI after several countries in this
region had implemented far-reaching economic
reforms. At the same time, post-socialist coun-
tries in economic transition have emerged as new
competitors for FDI.
Success and failure in becoming integrated
into the worldwide division of labour are clearly
mirrored by the highly diverse economic growth
performance of developing country groups. East
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa again represent
the opposite extremes, when comparing per cap-
ita GNP growth in 1985-1994 (World Bank
1996: Table 1): While the former region re-
corded an average annual growth rate of close to
7 per cent, per capita GNP declined in the latter
region. Between these extremes, South Asia per-
formed relatively well, whereas Latin America's
"lost decade" is still reflected in low average an-
nual growth of per capita GNP in 1985-1994.19
Table 5 - Projections of Annual Average Growth in Per



























Source: World Bank (1995: Table 18.2).
Economic growth performance is expected to
remain highly diverse under rather pessimistic
assumptions (Table 5)
22. The African malaise of
declining per capita income is projected to con-
tinue well into the next century in the
"divergent" scenario, which is one of muddling
through and is largely based on persistence of
past trends. According to this projection, income
differences between developing country groups
would widen further, and only the Asian region
would continue the process of catching-up with
OECD countries. Sub-Saharan Africa runs the
risk of falling further behind even under condi-
tions of strong policy action at the domestic
level, combined with deeper international inte-
gration, which are assumptions underlying the
"convergent" scenario. On the other hand, pro-
jections based on such optimistic assumptions
suggest that all other countries and regions con-
sidered in Table 5 would achieve significantly
higher per capita income growth than OECD
countries. In any case, developing countries in
Asia are expected to remain the economic pow-
erhouse of the world economy. But economic
growth in Latin America and former CMEA
countries would come close to Asian standards.
2. The Role of Economic Policy
The strikingly different experience of developing
countries in the era of globalisation raises the
obvious question on the determinants of success
and failure in becoming integrated into the inter-
national division of labour and achieving high
economic growth. This paper cannot provide a
comprehensive evaluation of this crucially im-
portant, but highly complex issue. Yet, some
relevant insights may be gained by addressing
major policy areas which are likely to play a
decisive role under conditions of globalisation.
The different and changing policy stance of gov-
ernments may indeed explain, why the presumed
"Asian Drama" turned out to be an "East Asian
Miracle" (Myrdal 1967; World Bank 1993),
why Latin America is recovering from the "lost
decade", why the economic marginalisation of
Sub-Saharan Africa may continue, and why
post-socialist countries in Central and Eastern
Europe are emerging as new competitors on
world goods and capital markets.
As argued above (Sections II and III), exoge-
nous factors such as the move towards regional
integration, autonomous decisions by multina-
tional corporations and technological develop-
ments cannot be blamed for the different per-
formance of developing countries in the era of
globalisation. This puts into perspective those
domestic economic policies that shape the inter-
national competitiveness of rather immobile
factors of production. Arguably, governments
are no longer free to pursue economic policies of
their own liking, unless they are prepared to de-
link their countries from worldwide trends. As it
seems, there are no promising policy alternatives
to striving for macroeconomic stability, encour-
aging investment in physical and human capital,
and ensuring openness with regard to interna-
tional trade and capital flows.
Macroeconomic stability, notably the absence
of high and volatile rates of inflation, is the first
indicator of a sound business environment. Ex-
cessive inflation results in higher investment
risks and a misallocation of resources. Inflation
is generally home-made, since budget deficits of
the government are its main reason. This is most
obvious when deficits are financed by printing
money. Alternatively, high budget deficits will
add to the tax burden of economic agents.
Countries with pervasive inflation and budget
deficits are, thus, relatively unattractive invest-
ment locations and are unlikely to experience
strong economic growth in the longer run. It
follows that the reputation for macroeconomic20
stability which many Asian governments had
established is at least partly responsible for the
"Asian Miracle" of world market integration and
economic catching-up. Developing countries in
Asia as a whole reported an average annual in-
flation rate of about 9 per cent in 1985-1994
(IMF 1995: 120-123). This compares favoura-
bly with Africa (28 per cent), not to speak of
Latin America (229 per cent) where various
countries have suffered from hyperinflation until
recently.
Second, more investment, induced by a stable
macroeconomic environment, increases labour
productivity and produces higher income in the
long run. With regard to physical capital accu-
mulation, East Asia displayed an outstanding
performance among developing countries. In
1994, for example, gross domestic investment
amounted to 36 per cent of GDP in this region
(World Bank 1996: Table 13). South Asia,
Latin America, and developing countries in
Europe and Central Asia all reported investment
rates somewhat above 20 per cent, whereas re-
markably low investment in Sub-Saharan Africa
(1994: 17 per cent) can be regarded as a major
reason for this region's economic marginalisa-
tion.
Human capital formation is the third factor
explaining success and failure of becoming in-
volved in globalisation. Various studies suggest
that this factor may be even more important in
driving economic growth than physical capital
accumulation (Barro 1991; Mankiw et al. 1992;
Gundlach 1995). This tends to be all the more so
in a globalising economy, given that the diffu-
sion of new technologies is advanced by declin-
ing information and transaction costs, and that
the application of such technologies depends on
the availability of complementary local skills.
Taking average years of schooling as a proxy of
the stock of human capital, the sharp contrast
between East Asia (1992: 6.5 years) and Sub-
Saharan Africa (2.3 years) is again borne out
(World Bank 1995: Table 18.1). As observed
for the preceding indicators of the international
competitiveness of rather immobile factors of
production, other developing country groups
rank in-between these extremes. Former CMEA
countries are an exception; they come closest to
OECD standards in terms of average years of
schooling (8.2 versus 9.6 years). It thus appears
that the integration of Central and Eastern
Europe into the world economy is helped consid-
erably by a comparatively favourable endow-
ment with human capital.
All in all, the Asian success in becoming a
most attractive location for international busi-
nesses is clearly related to a combination of
short- and long-run factors which can be shaped
by domestic economic policy. In other words,
economic backwardness is not necessarily a
permanent state of affairs. Macroeconomic
stability is a matter of public budget discipline
in the first place; the rate of investment is a
question of business conditions, especially with
respect to taxation; and the amount of compul-
sory formal education reflects the government's
attitude towards the provision of public goods.
Furthermore, recent empirical investigations re-
veal that openness in the form of largely unre-
stricted international trade and capital flows is
of utmost importance for achieving high eco-
nomic growth (Sachs and Warner 1995; Gund-
lach 1996). Openness eases the necessary tech-
nology import through imports of investment
goods, FDI inflows and other forms of interna-
tional investment cooperation. It promotes do-
mestic competition and efficiency, and supports
a closer integration into the world economy by
shaping the production structure according to
the respective comparative advantages of the
economy.
Developing countries in Asia attracted sub-
stantial FDI inflows and emerged as the world
economy's growth pole, since economic policy
responded in a more appropriate way than else-
where to the adjustment needs resulting from
progressing globalisation. A priori, there is no
reason why Asian-type success stories should
not happen in other parts of the world. Various
economies in Latin America and Central and
Eastern Europe appear to be moving in this di-
rection. Governments have increasingly accepted
that globalisation implies fewer degrees of free-
dom for domestic policy-making. They have
implemented macroeconomic stabilisation pro-
grammes and liberalised trade and FDI restric-
tions in order to reduce the risk of being delinked21
from world goods and capital markets. This
danger is still particularly pronounced in Sub-
Saharan Africa, where many governments con-
tinue to be hesitant in embarking on consistent
economic policy reforms.
V. Industrialised Countries under Adjustment Pressure
Both theoretical reasoning and empirical evi-
dence suggest that the emergence of new com-
petitors on world goods and capital markets
gives rise to substantial adjustment needs in in-
dustrialised countries. The progressing integra-
tion of developing countries and transition
economies into the international division of la-
bour has confronted the Triad of the EU, Japan
and the United States with similar challenges.
Nevertheless, the labour market implications of
globalisation have been strikingly diverse, and
the members of the Triad have responded in dif-
ferent ways to the challenge of globalisation.
1. Unemployment in the Triad:
Stylised Facts
The rate of unemployment surpassed 11 per cent
in the EU in 1994, although a significant eco-
nomic growth stimulus was widely expected to
result from the completion of the Internal Mar-
ket programme. Currently, hardly anyone ex-
pects labour market conditions to improve con-
siderably in the foreseeable future. All major EU
countries experienced a rise in unemployment
from 1974-1982 to 1983-1994, when compar-
ing period averages of standardised OECD data
on unemployment (Table 6).
2
3 The average of
the standardised rate of unemployment for seven
EU members
2
4 went up from 2.9 per cent in
1973 to 9.7 per cent in 1994. Nothing compa-
rable happened in Japan and the United States.
US unemployment had traditionally been higher
than unemployment in the EU, mainly because
of significant frictional unemployment, but the
standardised rate increased only modestly after
1973. The discrepancy is even more pronounced
when comparing the EU with Japan, where the
rate of unemployment remained below 3 per cent
until 1994.
Theory suggests that globalisation affects
low-skilled labour in OECD countries in the first
place (Section I). As a matter of fact, labour
demand has shifted to the disadvantage of low-
skilled labour section since the early 1980s
(Paqu6 1996). Unemployment of low-skilled
workers increased disproportionally in EU
countries, whereas the ratio of unemployment
rates between high-skilled and low-skilled work-
ers remained roughly constant in the United
States. A similar pattern prevails with regard to
long-term unemployment, which is frequently
considered a proxy for unemployment at the
lower end of the spectrum of qualifications. The
share of long-term unemployment in total un-
employment is exceptionally high in EU coun-
tries, as compared with both Japan and the
United States (Table 6). This points to a duali-
sation of EU labour markets. Furthermore, the
share of youth unemployment in total unem-
ployment increased significantly in EU countries
such as France and Italy, whereas it did not
change much in Japan and the United States
(Gundlach and Nunnenkamp 1996a: Figure 2).
The unfavourable unemployment record of the
EU was associated with less employment gen-
eration than elsewhere in the Triad. The Nether-
lands are the only exception in this respect. For
the remaining six EU countries listed in Table 6,
average annual employment growth in 1983-
1993 (0.6 per cent) was only half the employ-
ment growth in Japan, and about a third of em-
ployment growth in the United States.22













































































Source: OECD (various issues).
2. Adjustment Strategies: The Role of
Wages and Structural Change
The strikingly diverse labour market outcomes
strongly suggest that the members of the Triad
have reacted differently to the common challenge
of globalisation. Collective wage bargaining is
the first candidate in this respect. Evidence on
the distribution of earnings within the economies
under consideration indeed helps to explain the
puzzling unemployment patterns. The dispersion
in earnings widened considerably in the United
States and, though to a lesser extent, also in Ja-
pan (OECD various issues). Low-paid workers,
which can be assumed to represent the lower end
of the spectrum of labour qualifications, suf-
fered a decline in their real wages in the United
States, while high-paid (i.e., high-skilled) work-
ers benefited from above-average wage in-
creases. More pronounced wage dispersion in
the United States was probably supported by de-
centralised wage bargaining and modest unem-
ployment support. In sharp contrast, in most of
continental Europe, more generous unemploy-
ment support schemes and fairly centralised
collective wage bargaining worked against
greater wage dispersion. Consequently, the
wages of low-paid workers rose in line with
mean earnings, or even improved relative to the
mean (Gundlach and Nunnenkamp 1996a: Fig-
ure 3). This leads to the conclusion that high un-
employment, especially of low-skilled labour, is
the price that EU countries had to pay for insuf-
ficient relative wage flexibility.
Changes in the structure of employment in
manufacturing further support the proposition
that EU wage policies were inappropriate to deal
with the challenge of globalisation. The EU ex-
perienced a drastic cut in employment, for ex-
ample, in the textile and clothing industry. This
relatively labour-intensive industry suffered a
decline in relative world market prices, as com-
pared with world market prices of more
(physical and human) capital intensive goods,
which is in line with theoretical predictions out-
lined in Section I.
2
5 Nevertheless, the United
States prevented a significant reduction of em-
ployment in textiles and clothing. Compared
with the EU, the development of relative wages
was more in line with the development of rela-
tive world market prices.
At the same time, employment creation in
more skill-intensive industries (e.g., in manufac-
turing of automobiles) remained small in the EU
as compared with Japan. Trade data underscore
that, within the Triad, structural change has
been most pronounced in Japan. Measured by
world export shares for manufactures, the EU23
was clearly outperformed by Japan (and also by
the United States).
2
6 More interestingly though,
the development of world export shares differed
tremendously across manufacturing industries in
the case of Japan, whereas the pattern was
rather uniform in the case of the EU. The decline
in the EU's export shares was of similar magni-
tude in industries characterised by quite different
factor intensities. For example, the physical
capital intensive chemical industry as well as the
labour intensive textile and clothing industry lost
about three per centage points in world export
shares. The loss was somewhat more pro-
nounced in the production of machinery and
transport equipment; advanced EU economies
should possess comparative advantages in this
industry which is relatively human capital in-
tensive on average, although factor intensities
vary considerably within this broadly defined in-
dustry. In the case of Japan, the change in world
export shares for manufacturing as a whole ob-
scures significant variation at the industry level:
Labour intensive and standardised lines of pro-
duction such as clothing and textiles, metal
products, and iron and steel reported considera-
bly lower export shares in 1993 than in 1980.
On the other hand, machinery and transport
equipment recorded an increase in export shares
of twice the manufacturing average. The restruc-
turing of exports indicates that Japan was more
successful than the EU in specialising according
to its comparative advantages.
All in all, labour market developments are in
line with the proposition of an increasing
globalisation of production and markets. This is
not to ignore that other explanations such as
(low-skilled) labour-saving technological prog-
ress are also compatible with empirical facts.
2
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However, technological change itself may be
driven to a significant extent by the trend to-
wards globalisation. That is, globalisation im-
pairs the wage and employment prospects of
low-skilled labour in advanced economies either
directly or indirectly through technological
change. As it seems, the ensuing adjustment
needs, in terms of wage flexibility and structural
change, have been handled most effectively in
Japan, where economy-wide employment prob-
lems were largely avoided. US labour markets
have responded to fiercer worldwide competition
by remarkably flexible wage policies, whereas
restructuring towards skill-intensive manufactur-
ing remains a matter of concern. In the EU, ad-
justment has remained sluggish in terms of both
wage differentiation and structural change.
3. Policy Options Ahead
Economic policy-makers in advanced economies
are facing a major dilemma in the era of globali-
sation. The implication of enterprises having
more options to realise cost savings and exploit
profit chances at a worldwide scale is that gov-
ernment autonomy in economic policy-making is
shrinking. In particular, the effectiveness of
traditional means to protect non-competitive
factors of production is eroded. The protection
of low-skilled workers through restrictions im-
posed on labour-intensive imports is undermined
because trade barriers may be circumvented by
relocating production. Furthermore, the higher
mobility of capital and the easier access to tech-
nology enable new competitors to upgrade their
exports.
It is thus not surprising that it is heavily de-
bated in industrialised countries, notably in the
EU, in which way governments can contribute to
combating unemployment and ensuring techno-
logical leadership. The limited effectiveness of
conventional protectionist measures has fuelled
demands for more sophisticated protection. The
request for a multilateral harmonisation of stan-
dards with respect to social and ecological pro-
duction conditions is most noteworthy in this re-
spect. Common production standards would im-
pede the catching-up process of lower income
economies if these countries were required to
adhere to the demanding social and ecological
standards of industrialised economies. This
would ease the adjustment burden of ailing in-
dustries, but only at the cost of technologically
more advanced industries. The latter would suf-
fer from lower demand for their products in
emerging markets and from upgrading of ex-
ports by new competitors, if locational charac-
teristics were denied their role in shaping the in-
ternational division of labour. In essence, inno-24
vative protectionist measures resemble tradi-
tional means: They lead to allocative inefficiency
and structural rigidity in the protected economy,
while the incentives to increase productivity
through technological innovation are weakened.
Strategic industrial policy is frequently con-
sidered another option to tackle unemployment
and insufficient innovativeness. While the draw-
backs of persistent subsidies granted to ailing
industries are well-known, the more recent EU
experience with industrial targeting at high-tech
industries is not encouraging either. Frequently,
huge fiscal outlays failed to produce a signifi-
cantly improved world market performance of
the promoted industries; examples include the
European aircraft industry and the production of
semi-conductors. Arguably, the assumption un-
derlying the EU approach, namely that the com-
petitive strength of Japanese companies is be-
cause they are enjoying the advantages of an
unlevelled playing field, rather than being the
better players, is not valid. In any case, strategic
industrial policy is inherently flawed for various
reasons: Governments face serious constraints in
picking winners, i.e., identifying future growth
industries; the targeting of support schemes on
domestic enterprises becomes increasingly diffi-
cult under conditions of progressing interfirm
cooperation at a global scale; lobbying by large
companies is encouraged, whereas small inno-
vative enterprises may suffer from discrimina-
tion; and retaliation by foreign trading partners
is highly likely.
In the short run, there seems to be no alterna-
tive but to accept that the trade-off between
employment and wages has become more pro-
nounced in the era of globalisation. The US ex-
ample shows that employment of low-skilled
workers can be maintained if relative wages are
flexible. Hence, trade unions, especially in the
EU, have to agree to wage flexibility and wage
differentiation. Governments have to provide
appropriate incentives for employment-enhanc-
ing collective wage bargaining. This may require
generous unemployment benefits to be revised to
the extent that they discourage workers to accept
lower paid jobs. It should be noted, however,
that flexible wage policies cannot halt globalisa-
tion and the ensuing devaluation of low-skilled
labour in advanced economies. They only offer a
cushion until a longer term strategy becomes ef-
fective.
From low-skilled labour being the major
problem in advanced economies, it follows that a
strategy of tackling the causes of impaired com-
petitiveness must focus on human capital for-
mation. Industrialised countries have little choice
but to strengthen their comparative advantage in
skill-intensive sectors by improving the qualifi-
cation of the workforce. As globalisation implies
a permanent change of job requirements, human
capital has to be built in a way that allows for
flexibility and mobility of the workforce. To this
effect, the curricula of schools and universities
may have to be reviewed in cooperation with the
business sector, in order to narrow the gap be-
tween the skills supplied and those required in
labour markets. Likewise, existing systems of
vocational training, including the widely admired
German apprenticeship system, may have to be
revised, taking into account that the life-cycle of
vocational skills is shortened with proceeding
globalisation. Probably, there will be an increas-
ing demand for flexible generalists rather than
narrow specialists.
Specific training of the workforce may be left
to the market, but governments have a major
role to play in supporting human capital forma-
tion (for example, by taxing consumption rather
than savings). A bigger stock of skilled labour
delivers social benefits in terms of greater
flexibility in responding to economic change.
Reforms of the system of education and training
are likely to take considerable time to enhance
the competitive position in skill-intensive sec-
tors. It is exactly because of these time lags that
such reforms must not be postponed.25
VI. Summary
A more advanced international division of la-
bour offers vast opportunities to raise economic
welfare on a worldwide scale. Foreign trade al-
lows for specialisation according to the trading
partners' respective comparative advantages.
Cross-border mobility of capital and technology
renders it possible for enterprises to slice up the
value chain, i.e., to achieve a geographically
dispersed fragmentation of production. It is the
major characteristic of economic globalisation
that the international division of labour is
pushed forward by both mechanisms at the same
time. Yet, globalisation is not only instrumental
to raising world income, but also gives rise to
distributional conflicts. In the national realm, the
relatively scarce factors of production face
mounting adjustment pressure once the loca-
tional decisions of enterprises are no longer
constrained by segmented goods and factor mar-
kets. Internationally, welfare gains tend to be
unevenly distributed; various countries may be
badly prepared to meet the challenge of fiercer
competition, especially with respect to capital
and technology inflows. Two issues figure
prominently in the current debate on the oppor-
tunities and risks involved in globalisation. The
first question concerns the prospects of low-
income countries to become involved in globali-
sation and catch up economically with indus-
trialised countries. Furthermore, the discussion
centres around the labour market implications of
globalisation in industrialised countries, notably
on its impact on low-skilled workers.
Various arguments have been raised against
the proposition that globalisation amplifies ad-
justment pressure for industrialised countries
and offers better opportunities for developing
countries to derive economic benefits from a
more sophisticated division of labour. First, in-
come gains resulting from multilateral trade lib-
eralisation agreed upon in the Uruguay Round
have been shown to be concentrated on OECD
countries. Income gains are mainly due to the
countries' own liberalisation measures, rather
than better access to foreign markets. This im-
plies that developing countries could have in-
creased their share in worldwide welfare gains if
they had committed themselves more strongly
towards multilaterally binding trade liberalisa-
tion. In any case, multilateral trade liberalisation
represents a "win-win strategy" with only a few
possible exceptions in the short run. The neo-
mercantilist approach adopted by various gov-
ernments is thus grossly mistaken from a macro-
economic point of view, while it may support the
vested interests of pressure groups.
Second, the revival of regionalism may sug-
gest that the international division of labour is
progressing at a regional rather than at a global
scale. Countries remaining outside major inte-
gration schemes would then run the risk of being
excluded from closer trade and investment rela-
tions. Empirical evidence on trade and FDI pat-
terns is largely in conflict with this contention.
Regionalism, though important, is not the domi-
nant feature in the world economy. Closer trade
linkages have emerged both regionally and
globally. Asia's favourable world market per-
formance indicates that membership in, and
privileged market access to major integration
schemes matter less than domestic economic
policies for explaining successful participation
in international trade. Likewise, various coun-
tries have emerged as most attractive locations
for foreign investors, although institutionalised
ties with either the EU or NAFTA were largely
lacking.
Third, the chances that low-income countries
could induce catching-up processes would be
impaired if cross-border mobility of capital had
remained limited and FDI inflows were concen-
trated on a few fairly advanced economies. As a
matter of fact, capital owners reveal a home
country bias, but this bias has become less pro-
nounced since the 1970s. As concerns the distri-
bution of FDI, developing countries have in-
creased their share considerably, notably in the
early 1990s. Furthermore, the frequently noted
concentration of FDI on some major Third
World hosts tends to underrate the chances of
newcomers to derive economic benefits from
globalisation through attracting FDI. The coun-26
try composition of the group of major recipients
of FDI has changed over time, depending on the
local investment climate and the underlying eco-
nomic policies. At the same time, various small
economies have succeeded in attracting fairly
high per capita inflows of FDI.
Fourth, low-income countries are sometimes
believed to end up in a poverty trap if they spe-
cialise in labour-intensive and highly standard-
ised lines of production. However, the fact that
these countries are hardly involved in the gen-
eration of technological innovations does not
imply that they are delinked from technological
progress. Rather, imports of capital goods and
FDI inflows represent promising means to gain
access to internationally available technologies.
Low-income countries are best prepared to re-
ceive and apply appropriate technologies if they
specialise according to their comparative advan-
tages.
From all this it follows that neither foreign
trade nor international capital and technology
transfers are a zero-sum game. The emergence
of promising markets and new competitors for
foreign capital supports trade creation and addi-
tional investment opportunities. Empirical evi-
dence strongly suggests that developing coun-
tries have indeed achieved a closer integration
into the worldwide division of labour through
trade and investment relations. However, the
economic performance of different groups of
Third World countries has remained strikingly
diverse, with the "Asian Miracle" and the eco-
nomic marginalisation of Sub-Saharan Africa
representing the opposite extremes. Exogenous
factors such as the move towards regional inte-
gration, autonomous locational decisions by
multinational corporations and technological de-
velopments cannot be blamed for success and
failure in benefiting from globalisation. Rather,
a close link exists between economic perform-
ance and domestic economic policies that shape
the business environment prevailing in different
locations. Governments are no longer free to
pursue economic policies of their own liking. In
order to become involved in globalisation, there
is little choice but to ensure macroeconomic
stability, encourage physical and human capital
formation, and open up towards foreign trade
and capital inflows.
In principle, Asian-type success stories may
also happen in other parts of the world. The
chances for this to occur have improved since
many governments in Latin America and Central
and Eastern Europe have embarked on compre-
hensive stabilisation and liberalisation pro-
grammes. This is likely to confront the Triad of
the EU, Japan and the United States with even
more pressing adjustment needs than experi-
enced in the recent past already. Labour market
developments in the Triad support the proposi-
tion that globalisation affects low-skilled labour
in the first place, either directly or indirectly
through technological progress. The leading in-
dustrialised economies have reacted differently
to the common challenge of globalisation. The
need for structural change in production and ex-
port patterns seems to have been handled most
effectively in Japan. US labour markets have re-
sponded to fiercer worldwide competition by
remarkably flexible wage policies. In the EU,
particularly high unemployment — especially of
low-skilled workers — appears to be the price
that had to be paid for sluggish adjustment in
terms of wage differentiation and structural
change.
Industrialised countries should realise that the
effectiveness of traditional means to protect non-
competitive factors of production is eroded in
the era of globalisation. Moreover, protectionist
innovations as well as strategic industrial policy
do not provide reasonable alternatives with
which to tackle unemployment and insufficient
innovativeness. Wage flexibility does buy some
time for structural adjustment but cannot halt
globalisation and the ensuing devaluation of
low-skilled labour in advanced economies.
Hence, industrialised countries have little choice
but to promote human capital formation in order
to strengthen their comparative advantage in
skill-intensive lines of production.27
Endnotes
* For the theoretical framework underlying this interpretation, see Learner (1992).
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The current account mirrors the difference between savings and investment of an economy. Hence, net trade flows and
net physical capital flows are two sides of the same coin.
3 Such concerns are discussed by Bergsman and Lall (1995) and OECD (1996).
^ For a more detailed discussion of the Uruguay Round results, see Langhammer (1994).
Recent examples include the struggle over better market access of US producers in Japan and EU complaints about
allegedly subsidised steel exports of the Czech Republic.
According to WTO data, commercial services accounted for 21 percent of worldwide trade in goods and services in
1994; for further information, see WTO (1995).
For a summary, see Langhammer (1996); see also Langhammer (1994) and Martin and Winters (1995).
It fits into this picture that developing countries gain more than industrialised countries, if the assessment of the Uru-
guay Round is restricted to liberalisation of trade in manufactures (Harrison et al. 1995: 37). Traditionally, protection
of manufacturing industries has been lower in industrialised countries than in developing countries.
EU preferences are granted in the context of several free trade agreements, through a wide range of association and co-
operation agreements (including the Lome Convention), and within the generalised system of preferences (GSP); for
details, see Hiemenz et al. (1994: 10 ff.).
Most notably, the far-reaching agreement of 1991 to establish a common market comprising Argentina, Brazil, Para-
guay and Uruguay (MERCOSUR) by the end of 1994 has had little impact on trade patterns so far. The share of im-
ports from MERCOSUR members in total imports of Argentina and Brazil, for example, increased only marginally in
1990-1994; for details, see Foders (1996). It remains to be seen whether intra-MERCOSUR trade becomes more im-
portant once the common market, which includes a common external tariff, is in full operation.
* Several authors argue, however, that various Caribbean and Asian economies may be affected negatively by the erosion
of tariff preferences, which they traditionally enjoyed on US markets relative to Mexico, and by NAFTA's restrictive
rules of origin; see, e.g., Langhammer (1992: 17) and Bouzas (1995: 16).
For a more detailed assessment, see Gundlach and Nunnenkamp (1996b).
This rather surprising finding becameknown as the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle (Feldstein and Horioka 1980).
The correlation coefficient between savings and investment rates declined from more than 0.8 in the 1960s to about 0.6
in the 1980s (Feldstein 1994: 15).
^ For a more detailed analysis, see Agarwal et al. (1995).
*" This group comprises China, the four Asian NIEs and ASEAN(4); see notes to Table 2.
1
7 This follows from information provided in Wallraf (1996: 19) and UNCTAD (1995b).
*° The share of developing countries in worldwide FDI outflows increased from less than 6 percent in 1983-1988 to
nearly 15 percent in 1994 (UNCTAD 1995b: Annex Table 2).
1" For the limitations of this proxy, see Nunnenkamp et al. (1994: 38 ff.).
1X1 For an opposing view, see Freeman and Hagedoorn (1994: 779).
"71
The interpretation of the exports/GNP ratio has to be restricted to its development over time. The comparison across
country groups is not meaningful, because this ratio tends to be systematically lower for large economies.
For a more detailed presentation of different scenarios and their implications, see World Bank (1995: Section 18).
Statistical information in the following paragraphs is largely from Paque (1996) and Gundlach and Nunnenkamp
(1996a).
^ Comparable data are missing for other EU countries.
For a more detailed analysis, see Gundlach and Nunnenkamp (1996a).
Excluding intra-EU trade, the EU's share in world exports of manufactures declined by nearly 5 percentage points
since 1980, to 17.5 percent in 1993. The loss in market shares remained modest for the United States (0.8 percentage
points), while Japan raised its market share from 10.8 percent in 1980 to 12.7 percent in 1993 (own calculations based
on UN 1995). .
On the relevance of trade and technological progress for determining labour market outcomes, see Krugman and Law-
rence (1994), Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Wood (1994).28
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